

BACKGROUND GUIDE



NATO
OPEN AGENDA

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Letter From the Secretary Generals

Dear Participants,

We're honoured to announce our second ATAMUN conference and it is our promise that this year will be much better, bigger, stronger! Last year's conference was a success in certain areas but this year we believe we're much more trained. We are experienced, you may not be; no worries! The workshops that will be held prior to the conference will create an easy way to learn about the basics. As of now, we have 9 committees and a devoted academic team preparing for you. Two of those committees are junior targeted, we welcome all ages in our conferences. We chose relevant and interesting topics so as to achieve some of our goals. Them being;

To enrich your view of the world. That may be the political world but also cultures and ideologies. The more you know, the more you think. And think in a more benefiting way.

To enhance your leadership skills. MUN conferences are generally an amazing opportunity to face your fears of public speaking and of socialising. But the best part is sure enough of your idea to defend it against others. That is a huge step in diplomacy.

Socialize and build networks (and of course friendships!). Making friends at MUN conferences abroad or out of the city is fun.

Practice English. Just like leadership, you may start with just understanding what's going on at the conference. With time, that will evolve to knowing enough English to defend your idea. As world citizens, English is a priority. MUNs are an excellent area to practice.

We hope to see you at the conference which will take place in our school's building on March 6-8th, 2020.

Yours sincerely,

Hazal Turan

İdil Abeş

Introduction to NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations to provide collective security against the Soviet Union.



NATO was the first peacetime military alliance the United States entered into outside of the Western Hemisphere. After the destruction of the Second World War, the nations of Europe struggled to rebuild their economies and ensure their security. The former required a massive influx of aid to help the war-torn landscapes re-establish industries and produce food, and the latter required assurances against a resurgent Germany or incursions from the Soviet Union. The United States viewed an economically strong, rearmed, and integrated Europe as vital to the prevention of communist expansion across the continent. As a result, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed a program of large-scale economic aid to Europe. The resulting European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan, not only facilitated European

economic integration but promoted the idea of shared interests and cooperation between the United States and Europe. Soviet refusal either to participate in the Marshall Plan or to allow its satellite states in Eastern Europe to accept the economic assistance helped to reinforce the growing division between east and west in Europe.

In 1947–1948, a series of events caused the nations of Western Europe to become concerned about their physical and political security and the United States to become more closely involved with European affairs. The ongoing civil war in Greece, along with tensions in Turkey, led President Harry S. Truman to assert that the United States would provide economic and military aid to both countries, as well as to any other nation struggling against an attempt at subjugation. A Soviet-sponsored coup in Czechoslovakia resulted in a communist government coming to power on the borders of Germany. Attention also focused on elections in Italy as the communist party had made significant gains among Italian voters. Furthermore, events in Germany also caused concern. The occupation and governance of Germany after the war had long been disputed, and in mid-1948, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin chose to test Western resolve by implementing a blockade against West Berlin, which was then under joint U.S., British, and French control but surrounded by Soviet-controlled East Germany. This Berlin Crisis brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of conflict, although a massive airlift to resupply the city for the duration of the blockade helped to prevent an outright confrontation. These events caused U.S. officials to grow increasingly wary of the possibility that the countries of Western Europe might deal with their security concerns by negotiating with the Soviets. To counter this possible turn of events, the Truman Administration considered the possibility of forming a European-American alliance that would commit the United States to bolstering the security of Western Europe.

The Western European countries were willing to consider a collective security solution. In response to increasing tensions and security concerns, representatives of several countries of Western Europe gathered together to create a military alliance. Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Treaty in March, 1948. Their treaty provided collective defense; if any one of these nations was attacked, the others were bound to help defend it. At the same time, the Truman Administration instituted a peacetime draft, increased military spending, and called upon the historically isolationist Republican Congress to consider a military alliance with Europe. In May of 1948, Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg proposed a resolution suggesting that the President seek a security treaty with Western Europe that would adhere to the United Nations charter but exist outside of the

Security Council where the Soviet Union held veto power. The Vandenberg Resolution passed, and negotiations began for the North Atlantic Treaty.

In spite of general agreement on the concept behind the treaty, it took several months to work out the exact terms. The US Congress had embraced the pursuit of the international alliance, but it remained concerned about the wording of the treaty. The nations of Western Europe wanted assurances that the United States would intervene automatically in the event of an attack, but under the US Constitution the power to declare war rested with Congress. Negotiations worked toward finding language that would reassure the European states but not obligate the United States to act in a way that violated its own laws. Additionally, European contributions to collective security would require large-scale military assistance from the United States to help rebuild Western Europe's defense capabilities. While the European nations argued for individual grants and aid, the United States wanted to make aid conditional on regional coordination. A third issue was the question of scope. The Brussels Treaty signatories preferred that membership in the alliance be restricted to the members of that treaty plus the United States. The U.S. negotiators felt there was more to be gained from enlarging the new treaty to include the countries of the North Atlantic, including Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Ireland, and Portugal. Together, these countries held territory that formed a bridge between the opposite shores of the Atlantic Ocean, which would facilitate military action if it became necessary.

The result of these extensive negotiations was the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. In this agreement, the United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom agreed to consider attack against one an attack against all, along with consultations about threats and defense matters. This collective defense arrangement only formally applied to attacks against the signatories that occurred in Europe or North America; it did not include conflicts in colonial territories. After the treaty was signed, a number of the signatories made requests to the United States for military aid. Later in 1949, President Truman proposed a military assistance program, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program passed the U.S. Congress in October, appropriating some \$1.4 billion dollars for the purpose of building Western European defences.

The collective defense arrangements in NATO served to place the whole of Western Europe under the American "nuclear umbrella." In the 1950s, one of the first military doctrines of NATO emerged in the form of "massive retaliation," or the idea that if

any member was attacked, the United States would respond with a large-scale nuclear attack. The threat of this form of response was meant to serve as a deterrent against Soviet aggression on the continent. Although formed in response to the exigencies of the developing Cold War, NATO has lasted beyond the end of that conflict, with membership even expanding to include some former Soviet states. It remains the largest peacetime military alliance in the world.

Current Topics of Interest of the NATO

Expansion of NATO and Eastern Europe


Nato has been established with the driving purposes of securing peace in Europe, to promote cooperation among its members and guard their freedom and commits the Allies to democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and peaceful resolution of disputes. All of this in the context of countering the threat posed at the time by the Soviet Union.

The alliance started with 12 founding members in 1949. However, the founding treaty allows for other European nations to join the Alliance, as long as all existing Allies agree. All prospective member must share Nato's core values and have the capacity and willingness to contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

For its first four decades, the Cold war defined the Alliance and the collective defence was Nato's main role. When that confrontation ended in 1989 and with the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a strategic re-evaluation of NATO's purpose, nature, tasks, and their focus on the continent of Europe. This shift started with the 1990 signing in Paris of the Treaty on conventional Armed Forces in Europe between NATO and the Soviet Union, which mandated specific military reductions across the continent that continued after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. NATO also began a gradual expansion to include newly autonomous Central and Eastern European nations, and extended its activities into political and humanitarian situations that had not formerly been NATO concerns.

Between 1994 and 1997, wider forums for regional cooperation between NATO and its neighbours were set up, like the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. In 1998, the Nato-Russia Permanent Joint Council was established. On 8 July 1997, three

former communist countries Hungary, the Chechnya and Poland, were invited to join NATO, an invitation which was accepted by all three. Despite the critics, memberships to Nato went on expanding with the accession of seven more Central and Eastern European countries to NATO: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. They were first invited to start talks of membership during the 2002 Prague summit, and joined NATO on 29 March 2004. At the April 2008 Summit in Bucharest, Romania, NATO agreed to the accession of Croatia and Albania and both countries joined NATO in April 2009. Ukraine and Georgia were also told that they could eventually become members. The issue of Georgian and Ukrainian membership in NATO prompted harsh criticism from Russia, as did NATO plans for a missile defence system. Studies for this system began in 2002, with negotiations centered on anti-ballistic missiles being stationed in Poland and the Czechia. Though NATO leaders gave assurances that the system was not targeting Russia, both presidents Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev criticised it as a threat. Montenegro became the 29th and newest member of NATO on 5 June 2017, amid strong objections from Russia.



Although, this rapid enlargement may seem like a win-win situation for both NATO and its new members being in this alliance has consequences. First of all, before a country can be invited to join NATO it has to satisfy certain prerequisites: The country must be geographically within Europe, must be a democracy, must have the capacity and willingness to contribute to security of Euro-Atlantic area. But the question is that is NATO the best option to channel this willingness. Because the NATO has extensive amounts of commitments and obligation directed to invitee county that can be a significant challenge to the invitee country. The requirement and responsibility of

integrating the invitee country to certain aspects of NATO's work is also an important burden that could create more problems.

As the Nato's expansion continued drastically over the years of after-Cold-War-era, many Eastern European countries added the possibility of Nato membership in their agenda.

Ukraine

A sovereign, independent and stable Ukraine that firmly committed to democracy is key to the region's security. Relations between NATO and Ukraine date back to the early 1990s. However, since 2014, in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, cooperation has been intensified in critical areas.

Dialogue and cooperation started after the end of the Cold War, when newly independent Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace programme. This relation has been kept amicable to this date with the newly elected President Volodymyr Zelenskiy visited NATO Headquarters to discuss the security situation in Ukraine and NATO's continued support for Ukraine. President Zelenskiy underlined his eagerness to give new impetus to his country's engagement with NATO.

Throughout the crisis, regular consultations have taken place in the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) in view of the direct threats faced by Ukraine to its territorial integrity, political independence and security. Allied leaders met with President Petro Poroshenko at the NATO summits in Wales (September 2014) and Warsaw (July 2016). Foreign and defence ministers as well as ambassadors regularly discussed the security situation in and around Ukraine. Joint statements issued by NUC foreign ministers in April 2014, December 2014 and May 2015 and by Heads of State and Government at the NATO summit meetings in Wales and Warsaw demonstrate NATO's support for Ukraine.

The Allies have also pledged to support the efforts of the Ukrainian government to implement wide-ranging reforms to meet the aspirations of Ukrainian people to see their country firmly anchored among European democracies.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The 1995 NATO bombing of Bosnia and Herzegovina targeted the Bosnian Serb Army and together with international pressure led to the resolution of the Bosnian War and the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995. Since then, NATO has led the Implementation Force and Stabilisation Force, and other peacekeeping efforts in the country.

Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 2006, and signed an agreement on security cooperation in March 2007. The nation began further cooperation with NATO within their Individual Partnership Action Plan in January 2008. Bosnia then started the process of Intensified Dialogue at the 2008 Bucharest summit. The country was invited to join the Adriatic Charter of NATO aspirants on 25 September 2008. Then in November 2008, a joint announcement from the Defence Minister and the NATO Mission Office in Sarajevo suggested that Bosnia and Herzegovina could join NATO by 2011 if it continues with the reforms made in the defence-area so far.

In January 2009, Defence Minister Selmo Cikotić again confirmed Bosnia's interest in seeking a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the 2009 summit, with membership by 2012 at the latest. In February 2009 The Defence Minister of Bosnia, Selmo Cikotić, presented some poll numbers on NATO-membership: 70% of the country supports NATO-membership; however while 89% of the Federation Entity supports NATO-membership, only 44% in the Republic Srpska did. While the country did not receive an MAP at the April 2009 summit in Strasbourg–Kehl, Stuart Jones, an official of the US State Department, said on a September 2009 visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina that NATO was going to look at the possibilities for them to receive one in a December 2009 summit, repeating strong US support for the possibility. Then on 2 October 2009, Haris Silajdžić, the Bosniak Member of the Presidency, announced an official application for MAP. On 22 April 2010, NATO agreed to launch the MAP for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with certain conditions attached. Turkey is thought to be the biggest supporter of Bosnian membership.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet to fulfil the condition to launch an Annual National Programme under its MAP: the transfer of the registration of 63 military facilities from the local level to the central government. As of November 2018, 33 have been fully transferred, all of which are located in the Federation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. The Republika Srpska (RS), the Serbian political subdivision of Bosnia, has opposed the move and refuses to transfer the 23 properties located in its territory. A Bosnian court has ruled that it must transfer the military facility in Han Pijesak in RS to the Bosnian government. This was upheld by a ruling of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 16 August 2017.

FYROM

During the Kosovo War of 1999, the Macedonian government maintained a pro-NATO position. A majority of the population of the Republic of Macedonia criticised the government stance and opposed NATO intervention in Kosovo due to fears over irredentism from ethnic Albanians within the country, the unstable economy, disruption of trade brought about by war, and Slavic solidarity with Serbs. Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski stated during the war that anti-NATO sentiment was the "second biggest threat" to the country after the arrival of Albanian refugees from Kosovo. The country's Albanian population supported NATO and its intervention to assist the Albanians of Kosovo. But in 2008, a poll following the NATO summit showed that 82.5% of ethnic Macedonian citizens opposed changing their country's constitutional name in order to join NATO. NATO membership in general in 2008 was supported by 85.2% of the population. Elections were called following the 2008 summit, resulting in further support for the center-right pro-NATO party, VMRO-DPMNE. The elections were marred by violence that attracted criticism from NATO members. However, in a statewide 2010 survey, 80.02% of respondents said they would vote for the Republic of Macedonia to become part of NATO if a referendum on accession were to take place.

North Macedonia is in the process of acceding to the NATO as a member state. In 1995, the country joined the Partnership for Peace. It then began taking part in various NATO missions, including the International Security Assistance Force and the Resolute Support Mission in



Afghanistan. At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Greece vetoed the country's invitation to join; however, NATO member states agreed that the country would receive an invitation upon resolution of the Macedonia naming dispute. Following an agreement in June 2018 to rename the country, the permanent representatives to NATO of the member states signed a protocol on the accession of North Macedonia to NATO on 6 February 2019. All member states need to ratify before it enters into force. 28 of the 29 NATO member states have ratified it, and as of December 2019, Spain is the last country that needs to complete ratification for North Macedonia's accession into the alliance.

Moldova

In 1992, Moldova joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997. Relations expanded when Moldova joined the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) in 1994. The Partnership for Peace was signed by Mircea Snegur and Manfred Wörner, on 16 March 1994, with Moldova becoming the 12th signatory country and the second of the Commonwealth of Independent States after Ukraine.

The Mission of Moldova to NATO was established in 1997 with the appointment of the first Moldovan representative to the EAPC. The mission is located within the Embassy of Moldova in Brussels and has a liaison office in the premises of NATO headquarters in Brussels.

At the 2004 Istanbul summit, NATO accepted Russia's military presence in Moldova and Georgia (the withdrawal of these troops was an obligation Russia had assumed at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's 1999 Istanbul summit). US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stopped, en route to Istanbul, in Moldova, where he called for the withdrawal of Russian forces from the country.

Since then cooperation between NATO and Moldova grew with many actions ranging from The Individual Partnership Action Plan between NATO and Moldova that signed on 19 May 2006 and with the support of NATO's Public Diplomacy Division, an Information and Documentation Centre on NATO was inaugurated at the Moldova State University in October 2007. On 3 April, at the 2008 Bucharest summit, NATO announced its support for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Moldova. Voronin, former president of Moldova, participated to the Working Lunch of

the Heads of State and Government of countries Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Bucharest. On 18 November 2008, NATO Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 371 on the future of NATO–Russia relations, with among other things, "urges the government and the parliament of Russia to respect its commitments which were taken at the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999 and has to withdraw its illegal military presence from the Transdnistrian region of Moldova in the nearest future."

Although, the former communist government, which was seen as more allied with Russia and was already a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States lost its majority in parliament in 2009 elections and the new ruling party, the Alliance for European Integration was expected to strengthen the relations with NATO. But current foreign relations has declined to so far take any action to either move it toward membership, or withdraw from the Commonwealth of Independent States, and denies plans to do either. In April 2009 Moldova announced it would not participate in the June NATO military exercises.

A poll in June 2018 found that 22% of Moldovans would vote in favour of joining NATO, while 43% would oppose.

Serbia

Serbia originally determined in 2005, as Serbia and Montenegro, to join NATO. The subsequent independence of Montenegro and Kosovo have strained relations between Serbia and NATO. Serbia however joined the Partnership for Peace programme during the 2006 Riga Summit. While this programme is sometimes the first step towards full NATO membership, it is uncertain whether Serbia perceives it as signaling an intent to join the alliance. NATO historically fought Bosnian-Serbian forces during the Bosnian war and Serbia during the 1999 Kosovo Conflict.

Although current Serbian priorities do not include NATO membership, the Alliance has offered Serbia an invitation to enter the intensified dialogue programme whenever the country is ready. On 1 October 2008, Serbian Defence Minister Dragan Šutanovac signed the Information Exchange Agreement with the NATO, one of the prerequisites for fuller membership in the Partnership for Peace programme.

Neću Nato Anti-NATO signs in Serbia in 2011 following NATO's open support to Kosovo's declaration of independence in January 2008, support for NATO integration greatly dropped. An earlier poll in September 2007 had showed that 28% of Serbian citizens supported NATO membership, with 58% supporting the Partnership for Peace. The only political parties which currently support NATO integration are the minor opposition Liberal Democratic Party and Serbian Renewal Movement. The Democratic Party abandoned its pro-NATO attitude, claiming the Partnership for Peace is enough.

Kosovo

First encounter of NATO and Kosovo started with the KFOR's that deployed into Kosovo on 12 June 1999, in the wake of a 78-day air campaign. This air campaign was launched by the Alliance in March 1999 to halt and reverse the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding.

Kosovo submitted an application to join the PfP program in July 2012, though its lack of [recognition](#) by four NATO member states could impede its accession.

Belarus

The history of relations between Belarus and NATO began in 1992, when the country joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which was transformed in 1997 into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council – EAPC. And this relation is continued in 1995, the Republic of Belarus joined the “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) programme, viewing it as an important tool to strengthen cooperation in the political, military, economic, scientific and legal fields with NATO as a whole as well as with individual NATO members states. In April 1998, Belarus opened its Permanent Mission to NATO in Brussels.

The main planning document of Belarus' participation in the PfP is the annually updated Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP). The first Individual Partnership Program with Belarus was endorsed by the NATO Council in July 1997. Since then, the number of annual joint activities under the IPCP has increased more than six fold and now stands at around 125. IPCP specifies forces and assets allocated by the Belarusian side for the benefit of the PfP, as well as a list of activities to be attended by the representatives of Belarus. Regular consultations are held with NATO International Staff and International Military Staff on the IPCP Implementation Assessment. Belarus attaches great importance to the implementation of the IPCP as a

tool for development of practical cooperation with NATO in areas such as civil emergency planning, crisis management, military education, arms control, fighting against international terrorism and transnational organised crime, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, preparation for participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, medical services, language training.

In 2004, Belarus acceded to the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) with the main task to develop the framework of military cooperation with NATO. Fulfilment of Partnership Goals, selected within PARP, allows gaining relevant experience in improving the training of the Armed Forces of Belarus, with the possible aim of enabling their participation in multinational peace support operations.

NATO's Position on the INF

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty, was crucial to Euro-Atlantic security for decades. It eliminated a whole category of nuclear weapons that threatened Europe in the 1980s. All NATO Allies agree that the SSC-8/9M729 missile system developed and deployed by Russia violated the INF Treaty, while



posing a significant risk to Alliance security. Despite Allies' repeated calls on Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance, Russia continued to develop and deploy Treaty-violating systems, which led to the agreement's demise on 2 August 2019. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and United States President Ronald Reagan sign the INF Treaty at the White House, Washington, DC, in 1987. A historic moment for Alliance security.

NATO repeated its support for the United States' decision to abandon the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces agreement on Friday and said it would respond in

a “measured and responsible way” to a deployment of missiles by Moscow that violated the pact.

“Russia bears sole responsibility for the demise of the treaty,” the alliance said in a statement, repeating accusations that Russia had long been out of compliance by deploying medium-range missiles with both conventional and nuclear capability. Russia denies breaching the pact.

“There are no new NATO missiles in Europe, but there are many, many, many new Russian missiles,” Jens Stoltenberg, the alliance’s secretary-general, said at a news conference. “We don’t want a new arms race, and we have no intention to deploy new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe.”

Washington has for six years accused Russia of developing a new type of missile, the 9M729, also known as the SSC-8, which it says violates the treaty. The missile has a range estimated to be about 900 miles, though Moscow says it can travel only about 300 miles.

While blaming Russia, the United States has cited a threat from China, which was not a signatory to the treaty, as another reason for abandoning the pact. A large percentage of Chinese missiles are of intermediate range, and Washington plans to start testing a new class of intermediate-range missiles this summer that are intended to counter China.

But the abandonment of the pact leaves Europe exposed to Russian land-based missiles capable of hitting their targets within minutes — exactly the vulnerability that led to the treaty in the first place, after the United States started deploying Pershing II missiles in Europe in the early 1980s to counter Soviet SS-20s. The American deployments caused huge public protests in Western Europe and explain why NATO’s 29 countries do not want to go through the experience again.

“This potential could therefore considerably restrict NATO’s operational freedom of action in a conflict,” they wrote, and “as a result, NATO’s general ability to defend itself could be seriously compromised.”

How to deter Russia and balance its missile deployments is a problem that NATO has been discussing for months now.

Part of the answer are existing missiles based on ships or fired from airplanes, which were never covered by the I.N.F. treaty. The accord banned land-based missiles that can travel 310 to 3,417 miles and said they were to be destroyed.

At the end of June, Mr. Stoltenberg described “potential NATO measures,” including further military exercises involving intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance and “closer examination” of existing air and missile defenses and conventional capabilities. “We will ensure that our nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective,” he said.

On Friday, the NATO statement said blandly that the alliance had “agreed a balanced, coordinated and defensive package of measures to ensure NATO’s deterrence and defense posture remains credible and effective.”

The issue is expected to be central to NATO’s next summit meeting, scheduled for London in early December. Responses are likely to include an enhancement of missile defenses against ballistic and intermediate-range missiles, though some NATO members, like Germany, may be reluctant to have systems so directly aimed at countering Russia, argues Katarzyna Kubiak, an analyst with the European Leadership Network

Key Events

The INF Treaty was signed on 8 December 1987 by the United States and the former Soviet Union, and entered into force on 1 June 1988. It required both countries to eliminate their ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that could travel between 500 and 5,500 kilometres (between 300 and 3,400 miles) by an implementation deadline of 1 June 1991. By the deadline, the two countries had together destroyed a total of 2,692 short- and intermediate-range missiles: 1,846 Soviet missiles and 846 American missiles. It marked the first elimination of an entire category of weapons capable of carrying nuclear warheads. But in recent years, Russia has developed, produced, tested and deployed a new intermediate-range missile known as the 9M729, or SSC-8. The 9M729 is mobile and easy to hide. It is capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It reduces warning times to minutes, lowering the threshold for nuclear conflict. And it can reach European capitals. In July 2018, NATO Allies stated that after years of denials and obfuscation by the Russian Federation, and despite Allies repeatedly raising their concerns, the Russian Federation had only recently acknowledged the existence of the missile system without providing the necessary transparency or explanation. A pattern of behaviour and information over many years led to widespread doubts about Russian compliance. NATO Allies said that, in the absence of any credible answer from Russia on this new missile, the most plausible assessment was that Russia was in violation of the Treaty. In December 2018, NATO Foreign Ministers supported the finding of the United States that Russia was in

material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty and called on Russia to urgently return to full and verifiable compliance with the Treaty.

Allies remained open to dialogue and engaged Russia on its violation, including at a NATO-Russia Council meeting on 25 January 2019. Russia continued to deny its INF Treaty violation, refused to provide any credible response, and took no demonstrable steps toward returning to full and verifiable compliance. As a result of Russia's continued non-compliance, on 1 February 2019, the United States announced its decision to suspend its obligations under Article XV of the INF Treaty. This meant that the United States could terminate the Treaty within six months of this date if Russia had not come back into compliance.

Also on 1 February 2019, NATO Allies said that unless Russia honoured its INF Treaty obligations through the verifiable destruction of all of its 9M729 systems, thereby returning to full and verifiable compliance, Russia would bear sole responsibility for the end of the Treaty. NATO Allies also made clear that NATO would continue to closely review the security implications of Russian intermediate-range missiles and would continue to take steps necessary to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the Alliance's overall deterrence and defence posture.

On 15 February 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recalled at the Munich Security Conference that "it was on this very stage, at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, this was the place that President Putin first publicly expressed his desire for Russia to leave the INF Treaty. A treaty that is only respected by one side will not keep us safe". The Alliance did everything in its remit to encourage Russia to return to compliance before 2 August 2019 so as to preserve the INF Treaty.

On 26 June 2019, NATO Defence Ministers urged Russia once again to return to full and verifiable compliance. They also considered potential NATO measures – such as exercises, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air and missile defences, and conventional capabilities – and agreed that NATO would continue to ensure a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent. At the same time, Defence Ministers confirmed that NATO had no intention to deploy new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe, and did not want a new arms race.

On 2 August 2019, the United States' decision to withdraw from the Treaty took effect. NATO Allies issued a statement fully supporting the US decision, and attributing "sole responsibility" for the Treaty's demise to Russia. The statement made

clear that NATO would respond in a “measured and responsible way” to the risks posed by Russia’s SSC-8 system, with a “balanced, coordinated and defensive package of measures,” ensuring credible and effective deterrence and defence. Allies also made clear their firm commitment to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

"By fielding multiple battalions of SSC-8 missiles, Russia has made the world a more dangerous place." Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General.

Timeline


- **8 December 1987:** Signing of the INF Treaty.
- **11 May 1991:** Destruction of the last missiles covered under the Treaty.
- **23 May 2013:** The United States first raises its concerns with Russia about the missile system.
- **5 September 2014:** Wales Summit: Allies call on Russia to preserve the viability of the Treaty.
- **9 July 2016:** Warsaw Summit: Allies call on Russia to answer US charges and preserve the viability of the INF Treaty.
- **9 December 2017:** Russia admits the SSC-8/9M729 exists but claims it is compliant.
- **11 July 2018:** NATO Allies declare that Russia appears to be violating the INF Treaty.
- **20 October 2018:** The United States announces its intention to withdraw from the Treaty.
- **4 December 2018:** The United States declares Russia in material breach of the Treaty and NATO Foreign Ministers support the US finding on Russia's violation.
- **25 January 2019:** NATO Allies urge Russia to return to compliance at a NATO-Russia Council meeting.
- **1 February 2019:** The United States announces its decision to suspend compliance with the INF Treaty and NATO Allies issue a statement on Russia's failure to comply with the INF Treaty.

- **14 February 2019:** NATO Defence Ministers call again on Russia to come back into compliance.
- **26 June 2019:** NATO Defence Ministers agree that NATO will respond, should Russia fail to return to compliance, and consider potential measures.
- **2 August 2019:** The United States' decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty takes effect, with the full support of NATO Allies. Allies issue a statement attributing sole responsibility for the Treaty's demise to Russia, and announce their decision to respond in a measured and responsible way, while remaining firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

Crisis of Eastern Mediterranean

Turkish and Cypriot Oil and Gas Concessions

■ Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) concession blocks awarded by the Turkish government
■ TPAO concession blocks awarded by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
■ Republic of Cyprus concession blocks



The history of the increasing tension in the recent period dates back to the early 2000s, when scientific predictions about the rich natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean began to emerge.

Since 2002, the Republic of Cyprus has entered into Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreements with Egypt, particularly Egypt, other coastal countries, Lebanon, Syria and Israel. Turkey is the

subject of these agreements on the grounds that Cyprus and Turkey violated the rights of Turkey's UN vehicle and was approved by the UN at its exclusive economic zone map. Despite Turkey's UN appeal before in Cyprus, declared at the beginning of 2007, 13 exploration areas and the major oil companies have passed the licensing phase. In return, Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean region in its economic zone in the North of Cyprus in the island's north and east determine gave TPAO exploration licenses.

Cyprus is one of the 13 plots, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of a portion of parcels, Turkey's TPAO intersects with the block that is licensed. Parcel no. 3 coincides with the privileged area that Northern Cyprus has given to TPAO. Cyprus is seeking to turn its natural gas resources into economic wealth in the last 10 years. Stating that the Turkish side will benefit from the income to be obtained and a fund will be created for this, the Cyprus government aims to ease the pressure from the international community, especially the UN. The Cypriot government also aims to reduce the difficult situation in Turkey of the international plan, in line with this policy, the end of the negotiation process under UN supervision to spread unless predicts a deficit.

Turkey is continuing its moves against the policy which saw Cyprus unilaterally.

In Greece, which went to early elections on July 7, power changed, the radical left coalition (SYRIZA) finished second and the New Democracy Party came to power alone. Nikos Dendias will head the country's new Foreign Minister, in his first week, "Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean stop being naughty child should be a serious player," he said.

Turkey Foreign Ministry "We find odd the Dendias will head the statement. 'Spoiled child of Europe' title essentially belongs to Greece," he said and added: "The naughty child of Europe is the Greek Cypriot Administration, which is a member of the European Union in contradiction with international law and has been dragging the Eastern Mediterranean to the instability with Greece for years."

History of Cyprus

In 1878, as the result of the Cyprus Convention, the United Kingdom took over the government of Cyprus as a protectorate from the Ottoman Empire. In 1914, at the beginning of World War I, Cyprus was annexed by the United Kingdom. In 1925, following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus was made a Crown Colony. Between 1955 and 1959 EOKA was created by Greek Cypriots and led by George Grivas to perform enosis (union of the island with Greece). However the EOKA campaign did not result in union with Greece but rather an independent republic, The Republic of Cyprus, in 1960.

The 1960 constitution put in place a form of power-sharing, or consociational government, in which concessions were made to the Turkish Cypriots minority, including as a requirement that the vice-president of Cyprus and at least 30% of members of parliament be Turkish Cypriots. Archbishop Makarios III would be the President and Dr. Fazıl Küçük would become Vice President. One of the articles in the constitution was the creation of separate local municipalities so that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could manage their own municipalities in large towns.

Internal conflicts turned into full-fledged armed fighting between the two communities on the island which prompted the United Nations to send peacekeeping forces in 1964; these forces are still in place today. In 1974, Greek nationalists performed a military coup with the support of military junta in Greece. Unable to secure multilateral support against the coup, Turkey invaded the northern portion of the island. Turkish forces remained after a cease-fire, resulting in the partition of the island. The intercommunal violence, the coup, and the subsequent invasion led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Cypriots.

The de facto state of Northern Cyprus was proclaimed in 1975 under the name of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. The name was changed to its present form, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on 15 November 1983. Recognised only by Turkey, Northern Cyprus is considered by the international community to be part of the Republic of Cyprus.

In 2002 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan started a new round of negotiations for the unification of the island. In 2004 after long negotiations between both sides a plan for unification of the island emerged. The resulting plan was supported by United Nations, European Union and the United States. The nationalists on both sides campaigned for the rejection of the plan, the result being that Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan while Greek Cypriots rejected it overwhelmingly.

After Cyprus became a member of the European Union in 2004, it adopted the euro as its currency on January 1, 2008, replacing the previously used Cypriot pound; Northern Cyprus continued to use the Turkish lira.

Guarantor countries

United Kingdom: United Kingdom was impartial due to the crisis of Cyprus in 1970s but in this time UK is supporting Greece and getting benefits from Eastern Mediterranean Gas Sources.

Turkey: In 1974, following a coup aiming at Cyprus' annexation by Greece, Ankara had to intervene as a guarantor power. In 1983, the TRNC was founded.

The decades since then have seen several attempts to resolve the dispute, all ending in failure. The latest one, held with the participation of the guarantor countries-Turkey, Greece, and the U.K. - ended in 2017 in Switzerland.

Greece: Greece has been guarantor country for almost sixty years. All three countries became guarantor countries in 1959. They signed an agreement called Guarantor Agreement. That you are going to find it in followed page

WARRANTY AGREEMENT (Zurich, 11 February 1959)

On the one hand the Republic of Cyprus, on the other hand, Greece, Great Britain and Turkey,

1. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, established and regulated by the articles of the Constitution, is a requirement of its own common benefits.

2. Wishing for cooperation to ensure respect for the constitution and the situation established, they agreed on the following issues:

Clause 1

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to maintain its independence, territorial integrity and security and to secure respect for the constitution. (undertakes)

The Republic of Cyprus also undertakes not to engage in any form of political or economic integration with any state in whole or in part. (responsibility is loaded)

For this purpose, the Republic of Cyprus prohibits all actions that help and encourage the realization of the island either directly or indirectly, which would lead to the merger and division of the island.

Clause 2

Greece, UK and Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus saving their commitments stated in the 1st article, the Republic of Cyprus's independence, territorial integrity, condition that occurs with security and basic articles of the constitution (state of affairs) recognize and guarantee the independence.

Greece, UK and Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus should unite with any other state. as well as all actions that have the purpose of assisting and encouraging to realize the division of the Island directly or indirectly.

Clause 3

Any violation of the provisions of this Treaty (be chewed) into Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom with the aim of taking the necessary initiatives and measures to ensure respect for these provisions shall undertake to engage in consultations between them. If one of the three guarantor states is unable to act together or in consultation with each other, they retain the right to act exclusively to re-establish the state of affairs of this treaty.

Clause 4.

This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of its signature.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to register this treaty with the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as possible in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Maritime Jurisdiction Agreement between Turkey and Libya

This month, Turkey's unusual outreach to the internationally recognized government of Libya has resulted in a formal agreement for Ankara to provide military support,



including arms and possibly troops, in its bid to hold off an offensive from Russian-backed rebels in the eastern part of the country. The military agreement came just weeks after Turkey and that same Government of

National Accord reached an agreement that raised concerns.

Turkey’s pledge of military support, which Libya formally accepted last week, comes at a critical time in the battle between the United Nations-recognized government and the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army, which just renewed its assault on the city of Misrata and again demanded that Turkish-backed militias withdraw from the capital city of Tripoli. Both the United States and the European Union expressed concern at the escalation in Libya, and especially international involvement on both sides-which includes ongoing violations of the U.N. arms embargo on Libya.

From Ankara’s perspective, the pair of agreements with Libya potentially offer a way to shape the region’s future into the peace. “Turkey’s recent agreement with Libya’s legitimate government about maritime delimitation line and defense cooperation deal is crucial for protecting Turkey’s and Libya’s rights in the Eastern Mediterranean region,” said a column in the *Daily Sabah* newspaper

The link between military support for Libya and Turkey’s geopolitical position in the region was the declaration, formalized earlier this month, of a new maritime boundary line between Turkey and Libya. As a result of that bilateral agreement, Turkey is laying claim to a huge chunk of the eastern Mediterranean—an area that includes large reservoirs of natural gas that Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and even Lebanon are racing to exploit.

For several years, Turkey has pushed back against efforts by Cyprus to exploit those gas discoveries by harassing drill ships operating there with Turkish naval vessels and sending its own drilling ships into Cypriot waters. By laying legal claim to a big chunk of the Mediterranean especially between Greece and Egypt. Turkish President

Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Monday insisted he won't back down from his new Libyan deals, despite the protests from other countries.

The energy question in the eastern Mediterranean is taking on new urgency from Ankara's point of view. The United States passed legislation last week that will boost U.S. support for energy development in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as greater security assistance for Greece and Cyprus.

Perhaps more importantly, after years of talking about it, Greece, Israel, and Cyprus are getting closer to a deal on a pipeline that would carry natural gas right through those disputed waters, via Crete, to Greece and Italy. On Sunday, the three countries said they could formalize an intergovernmental agreement on the EastMed pipeline as soon as January 2, though crucially Italy hasn't yet indicated that it will sign the accord.

Cyber Defence

Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are becoming more frequent, complex, destructive and coercive. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. NATO and its Allies rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliance's core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. The Alliance needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats and attacks it faces.

NATO Policy on Cyber Defence

To keep pace with the rapidly changing threat landscape and maintain robust cyber defences, NATO adopted an enhanced policy and action plan, which were endorsed by Allies at the Wales Summit in September 2014. An updated action plan has since been endorsed by Allies in February 2017. The policy establishes that cyber defence is part of the Alliance's core task of collective defence, confirms that international law applies in cyberspace, seeks to further develop NATO's and Allies' capabilities, and intensifies NATO's cooperation with industry. The top priority is the protection of the networks owned and operated by the Alliance.



The policy also reflects Allied decisions on issues such as streamlined cyber defence governance, procedures for assistance to Allied countries, and the integration of cyber defence into operational planning (including civil preparedness). In addition, the policy defines ways to take forward awareness, education, training and exercise activities, and encourages further progress in various cooperation initiatives, including those with partner countries and international organisations. It also foresees boosting NATO's cooperation with industry, including on information-sharing and the exchange of best practices. Allies have also committed to enhancing information-sharing and mutual assistance in preventing, mitigating and recovering from cyber attacks.

NATO's cyber defence policy is complemented by an action plan with concrete objectives and implementation timelines on a range of topics from capability development, education, training and exercises, and partnerships.

At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, Allies reaffirmed NATO's defensive mandate and recognised cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea. As most crises and conflicts today have a cyber dimension, treating cyberspace as a domain enables NATO to better protect and conduct its missions and operations.

At Warsaw, Allies also pledged to strengthen and enhance the cyber defences of national networks and infrastructures, as a matter of priority. Together with the continuous adaptation of NATO's cyber defence capabilities, as part of NATO's long-term adaptation, this will reinforce the cyber defence and overall resilience of the Alliance.

Developing the NATO Cyber Defence Capability

The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) based at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, protects NATO's own networks by providing centralised and round-the-clock cyber defence support. This capability is expected to evolve on a continual basis and maintain pace with the rapidly changing threat and technology environment.

To facilitate an Alliance-wide and common approach to cyber defence capability development, NATO also defines targets for Allied countries' implementation of national cyber defence capabilities via the NATO Defence Planning Process.

Cyber defence has also been integrated into NATO's Smart Defence initiatives. Smart Defence enables countries to work together to develop and maintain capabilities they

could not afford to develop or procure alone, and to free resources for developing other capabilities. The Smart Defence projects in cyber defence include the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) and the Smart Defence Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development (MN CD2) project. The Multinational Cyber Defence Education and Training (MN CD E&T) project recently concluded its work.

NATO is also helping its Allies by sharing information and best practices, and by conducting cyber defence exercises to help develop national expertise. Similarly, individual Allied countries may, on a voluntary basis and facilitated by NATO, assist other Allies to develop their national cyber defence capabilities.

Increasing NATO Cyber Defence Capacity

Recognising that cyber defence is as much about people as it is about technology, NATO continues to improve the state of its cyber defence education, training and exercises.

NATO conducts regular exercises, such as the annual Cyber Coalition Exercise, and aims to integrate cyber defence elements and considerations into the entire range of Alliance exercises, including the Crisis Management Exercise (CMX). NATO is also enhancing its capabilities for cyber education, training and exercises, including the NATO Cyber Range, which is based at a facility provided by Estonia.

To enhance situational awareness, an updated Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cyber Defence was developed in 2015. This updated MOU is being concluded between NATO and the national cyber defence authorities of each of the 29 Allies. It sets out arrangements for the exchange of a variety of cyber defence-related information and assistance to improve cyber incident prevention, resilience and response capabilities.

The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE) in Tallinn, Estonia is a NATO-accredited research and training facility dealing with cyber defence education, consultation, lessons learned, research and development. Although it is not part of the NATO Command Structure, the CCD CoE offers recognised expertise and experience.

The NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS) in Latina, Italy provides training to personnel from Allied (as well as non-NATO) nations relating to the operation and maintenance of NATO communications and information

systems. NCISS is relocating to Portugal, where it will provide greater emphasis on cyber defence training and education.

The NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany conducts cyber defence-related education and training to support Alliance operations, strategy, policy, doctrine and procedures. The NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy fosters strategic thinking on political-military matters, including on cyber defence issues.

Cooperating with Partners

Because cyber threats defy state borders and organisational boundaries, NATO engages with a number of partner countries and other international organisations to enhance international security.

Engagement with partner countries is based on shared values and common approaches to cyber defence. Requests for cooperation with the Alliance are handled on a case-by-case basis founded on mutual interest.

NATO also works with, among others, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Cyber defence is one of the areas of strengthened cooperation between NATO and the EU, as part of the two organisations' increasingly coordinated efforts to counter hybrid threats. NATO and the EU share information between cyber crisis response teams and exchange best practices. Cooperation is also being enhanced on training, research and exercises.

Cooperating with Industry

The private sector is a key player in cyberspace, and technological innovations and expertise from the private sector are crucial to enable NATO and Allied countries to effectively respond to cyber threats.

The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence is implemented by NATO's political, military and technical authorities, as well as by individual Allies. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) provides high-level political oversight on all aspects of implementation. The NAC is apprised of major cyber incidents and it exercises principal authority in cyber defence-related crisis management.

The Cyber Defence Committee, subordinate to the NAC, is the lead committee for political governance and cyber defence policy in general. At the working level, the NATO Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB) is responsible for coordinating cyber defence throughout NATO civilian and military bodies. The CDMB comprises the leaders of the policy, military, operational and technical bodies in NATO with responsibilities for cyber defence.

The NATO Consultation, Control and Command (NC3) Board constitutes the main committee for consultation on technical and implementation aspects of cyber defence. The NATO Military Authorities (NMA) and the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) bear the specific responsibilities for identifying the statement of operational requirements, acquisition, implementation and operating of NATO's cyber defence capabilities. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is responsible for the planning and conduct of the annual Cyber Coalition Exercise.

NCIA, through its NCIRC Technical Centre in Mons, Belgium, is responsible for the provision of technical cyber security services throughout NATO. The NCIRC Technical Centre has a key role in responding to any cyber incidents affecting NATO. It handles and reports incidents, and disseminates important incident-related information to system/security management and users. The NCIRC Coordination Centre is a staff element responsible for the coordination of cyber defence activities within NATO and with member countries, and for staff support to the CDMB.

Key Events

Although NATO has always protected its communications and information systems, the 2002 Prague Summit first placed cyber defence on the Alliance's political agenda. Allied leaders reiterated the need to provide additional protection to these information systems at the Riga Summit in 2006.

Following the cyber attacks against Estonia's public and private institutions in 2007, Allied defence ministers agreed that urgent work was needed in this area. As a result, NATO approved its first Policy on Cyber Defence in January 2008.

In the summer of 2008, the conflict between Russia and Georgia demonstrated that cyber attacks have the potential to become a major component of conventional warfare.

NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, during which the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was tasked to develop an in-depth NATO cyber defence policy and to prepare an action plan for its implementation.

In June 2011, NATO defence ministers approved the second NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, which set out a vision for coordinated efforts in cyber defence throughout the Alliance within the context of the rapidly evolving threat and technology environment. This was accompanied by an action plan for implementation.

In April 2012, cyber defence was introduced into the NATO Defence Planning Process. Relevant cyber defence requirements are identified and prioritised through the defence planning process.

At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, Allied leaders reaffirmed their commitment to improving the Alliance's cyber defences by bringing all of NATO's networks under centralised protection and implementing a series of upgrades to the NCIRC – NATO's cyber defence capability.

In July 2012, as part of the reform of NATO's agencies, the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) was established.

In February 2014, Allied defence ministers tasked NATO to develop a new, enhanced cyber defence policy regarding collective defence, assistance to Allies, streamlined governance, legal considerations and relations with industry.

In April 2014, the NAC agreed to rename the Defence Policy and Planning Committee/ Cyber Defence as the Cyber Defence Committee.

At the Wales Summit in September 2014, Allies endorsed a new cyber defence policy and approved an action plan that, along with the policy, contributes to the fulfilment of the Alliance's core tasks. Cyber defence was recognised as part of NATO's core task of collective defence, and Allies agreed that international law applies in cyberspace.

On 17 September 2014, NATO launched an initiative to boost cooperation with the private sector on cyber threats and challenges. Endorsed by Allied leaders at the Wales Summit, the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP) was presented at a two-day cyber conference held in Mons, Belgium, where 1,500 industry leaders and policy makers gathered to discuss cyber collaboration. The NICP recognises the importance of working with industry partners to enable the Alliance to achieve its cyber defence policy's objectives.

On 10 February 2016, NATO and the EU concluded a Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence to help both organisations better prevent and respond to cyber attacks. This Technical Arrangement between NCIRC and the Computer Emergency Response Team of the EU (CERT-EU) provides a framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between emergency response teams.

On 14 June 2016, Allied defence ministers agreed to recognise cyberspace as a domain at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July. This recognition does not change NATO's mission or mandate, which is defensive. As in all areas of action, NATO will exercise restraint and act in accordance with international law. The Alliance also welcomed efforts undertaken in other international fora to develop norms of responsible state behaviour and confidence-building measures to foster a more transparent and stable cyberspace.

At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, Allied Heads of State and Government reaffirmed NATO's defensive mandate and recognised cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea. This improved NATO's ability to protect and conduct its missions and operations.

Allies also committed through a Cyber Defence Pledge to enhancing the cyber defences of their national networks and infrastructures, as a matter of priority. Each Ally will honour its responsibility to improve its resilience and ability to respond quickly and effectively to cyber attacks, including as part of hybrid campaigns.

On 6 December 2016, NATO and the EU agreed on a series of more than 40 measures to advance how the two organisations work together – including on countering hybrid threats, cyber defence, and making their common neighbourhood more stable and secure. On cyber defence, NATO and the EU will strengthen their mutual participation in exercises, and foster research, training and information-sharing.

On 16 February 2017, Allied defence ministers approved an updated Cyber Defence Action Plan, as well as a roadmap to implement cyberspace as a domain of operations. This increased Allies' ability to work together, develop capabilities and share information.

Also on 16 February 2017, NATO and Finland stepped up their engagement with the signing of a Political Framework Arrangement on cyber defence cooperation. The arrangement allows NATO and Finland to better protect and improve the resilience of their networks.

On 8 November 2017, NATO defence ministers expressed their agreement in principle on the creation of a new Cyberspace Operations Centre as part of the outline design for the adapted NATO Command Structure. The aim is to strengthen NATO's cyber defences and help integrate cyber into NATO planning and operations at all levels. Ministers also agreed to allow the integration of Allies' national cyber contributions into Alliance operations and missions. Allies will maintain full ownership of those contributions, just as Allies own the tanks, ships and aircraft in NATO missions.

On 5 December 2017, NATO and EU ministers agreed to step up cooperation between the two organisations in a number of areas, including cyber security and defence. Analysis of cyber threats and collaboration between incident response teams is one area of further cooperation; another is the exchange of good practices concerning the cyber aspects and implications of crisis management.

At the Brussels Summit in 2018, Allied leaders agreed to set up a new Cyberspace Operations Centre as part of NATO's strengthened Command Structure. The Centre will provide situational awareness and coordination of NATO operational activity within cyberspace. Allies also agreed that NATO can draw on national cyber capabilities for its missions and operations. Allies also took stock of their progress to enhance national resilience through the Cyber Defence Pledge.

In February 2019, NATO defence ministers endorsed a NATO guide that sets out a number of tools to further strengthen NATO's ability to respond to significant malicious cyber activities. NATO needs to use all the tools at its disposal, including political, diplomatic and military, to tackle the cyber threats that it faces. The response options outlined in the NATO guide will help NATO and its Allies to enhance their situational awareness about what is happening in cyberspace, boost their resilience, and work together with partners to deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.

Russian Attempts to Destabilise NATO

Relations with Russia

NATO's concerns go well beyond Russia's activities in Ukraine. The Allies continue to express their support for the territorial integrity of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova within their internationally recognised borders and call on Russia to withdraw the forces it has stationed in all three countries without their consent.

Russia's military activities, particularly along NATO's borders, have increased and its behaviour continues to make the Euro-Atlantic security environment less stable and predictable, in particular its practice of calling snap exercises, deploying near NATO borders, conducting large-scale training and exercises and violating Allied airspace. Russia is also challenging Euro-Atlantic security and stability through hybrid actions, including attempted interference in the election processes and the sovereignty of nations, widespread disinformation campaigns and malicious cyber activities. The Allies also condemn the use of a military-grade nerve agent in Salisbury in March 2018, and express solidarity with the United Kingdom. In the wake of this attack, the maximum number of personnel in the Russian Mission at NATO Headquarters was reduced by 10 people.

This is compounded by Russia's continued violation, non-implementation and circumvention of numerous obligations and commitments in the realm of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. Allies have long been concerned about Russia's ongoing selective implementation of the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty, and its long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty which undermine Euro-Atlantic security. Moreover, in December 2018, NATO foreign ministers supported the finding of the United States that Russia was in material breach of its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty not to possess, produce or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometres, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles. The Allies concluded that Russia had developed and fielded a missile system, the SSC-8 (9M729), which violated the Treaty and posed significant risks to Euro-Atlantic security, and called on Russia to return urgently to full and verifiable compliance. On 1 February 2019, the United States suspended its obligations under the INF Treaty, providing the requisite six-month written notice to Treaty Parties of its withdrawal. The Allies remained open to dialogue and engaged Russia on its violation, including at two NATO-Russia Council meetings in January and July 2019. However, Russia continued to deny its INF Treaty violation, refused to provide any credible response, and took no demonstrable steps toward returning to full and verifiable compliance. As a result, on 2 August, the United States decided to withdraw from Treaty with the full support of the Allies. NATO will respond in a measured and responsible way to the significant risks posed by Russia's SSC-8 system. At the same time, Allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. For over three decades, the INF Treaty was a landmark in arms control. It entered into force in 1988 with the aim to reduce threats to security and stability in Europe – in particular the threat of

short-warning attack on targets of strategic importance – by requiring the verifiable elimination of an entire class of missiles possessed by the United States and the former Soviet Union.

Russia's military intervention and considerable military presence in Syria have posed further risks for the Alliance. On 5 October 2015, in response to Russia's military intervention in Syria, the Allies called on Russia to immediately cease their attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians, to focus its efforts on fighting so-called Islamic State, and to promote a solution to the conflict through a political transition. In April 2018, Allies expressed strong support to the US, UK and French joint military action in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

For more than two decades, NATO has worked to build a partnership with Russia, including through the mechanism of the NRC, based upon the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration. Russia has breached its commitments, as well as violated international law, breaking the trust at the core of its cooperation with NATO.

The Allies continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect for international law, would be of strategic value. They continue to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship with Russia – including reciprocal confidence-building and transparency measures and increased mutual understanding of NATO's and Russia's non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe – based on common security concerns and interests, in a Europe where each country freely chooses its future. They regret that the conditions for that relationship do not currently exist. Meeting at the Brussels Summit in July 2018, Allied leaders underlined that there can be no return to 'business as usual' until there is a clear, constructive change in Russia's actions that demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.

Key Areas of Cooperation Prior to April 2014

To facilitate regular contacts and cooperation, Russia established a diplomatic mission to NATO in 1998. NATO opened an Information Office in Moscow in 2001 and a Military Liaison Mission in 2002.

Until the suspension of activities in April 2014, the NRC provided a framework for consultation on current security issues and practical cooperation in a wide range of areas of common interest:

Support for NATO-led operations: For a number of years, Russia supported the NATO-led, UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan through various arrangements to facilitate the transit of non-military equipment for ISAF contributors across Russian territory. Several Russian ships were deployed in support of Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's maritime operation against terrorism in the Mediterranean, and as part of Operation Ocean Shield, NATO's counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa. Until the withdrawal of its peacekeepers in early 2003, Russia supported the NATO-led peace-support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

Support for the Afghan Armed Forces: The NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund project, launched in 2011, helped train Afghan Armed Forces to operate and maintain their helicopter fleet and to conduct medical evacuations. Some 40 Afghan helicopter maintenance staff were trained by the end of 2013.

Counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel: The NRC Counter-Narcotics Training Project, launched in December 2005, helped to build local capacity and promote regional networking and cooperation among mid-level officers from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Pakistan joined in 2010. Implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), fixed training took place in one of four institutes in Turkey, Russia or the United States and mobile courses were conducted in each of the seven participating countries. Over 3,500 officers were trained under the project. (Since the suspension of cooperation with Russia, NATO has organised a new project with the UNODC.)

Combating terrorism: An NRC Action Plan on Terrorism was launched in December 2004. Cooperation in this area included exercises and regular exchanges of information and in-depth consultations on various aspects, such as consequence management, countering improvised explosive devices, and hosting and securing high-visibility events. Under the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, an information exchange system was developed to provide air traffic transparency and early notification of suspicious air activities to help prevent terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 attacks on the United States. The STANDEx project developed technology to enable the stand-off detection of explosive devices in mass transport environments, and successful live trials took place in June 2013.

Theatre missile defence/ ballistic missile defence: A common concern was the unprecedented danger posed to deployed forces by the increasing availability of ever

more accurate ballistic missiles. A study, launched in 2003, assessed the possible levels of interoperability among the theatre missile defence systems of the Allies and Russia, and command post and computer-assisted exercises were organised to develop mechanisms and procedures for joint operations. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders approved a joint ballistic missile threat assessment and agreed to develop a joint analysis of the future framework for missile defence cooperation. (While Russia continues to voice concerns about NATO's planned missile defence capability, Allies underline that it is not directed against Russia, nor will it undermine Russia's strategic deterrent but is intended to defend against potential threats from beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.)

Non-proliferation and arms control: Expert discussions focused on issues related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, developing recommendations to strengthen existing non-proliferation arrangements and exploring possible practical cooperation in the protection against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Frank discussions took place on issues related to conventional arms control, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Open Skies Treaty and confidence- and security-building measures. A key priority was to work towards the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty – so the Allies expressed concern over Russia's unilateral "suspension" of its participation in the treaty in December 2007 and its subsequent decision in March 2015 to suspend participation in the joint consultative group that meets in Vienna regularly to discuss the implementation of the CFE Treaty.

Nuclear weapons issues: Several seminars focused on nuclear doctrine and strategy, lessons learned from nuclear weapons incidents and accidents, and potential responses to the detection of improvised nuclear or radiological devices. Between 2004 and 2007, experts and representatives from NRC countries also observed four nuclear weapon accident response field exercises, which took place in Russia and each of NATO's nuclear weapon states (France, the United Kingdom and the United States). Such activities increased transparency, developed common understanding of nuclear weapons accident response procedures, and built confidence that the nuclear weapon states were fully capable of responding effectively to any emergency involving nuclear weapons.

Military-to-military cooperation: Military liaison arrangements were enhanced under the NRC at the Allied Commands for Operations and for Transformation, as well as in Moscow. A key objective of military-to-military cooperation was to build trust, confidence and transparency, and to improve the ability of NATO and Russian forces to work together in preparation for possible future joint military operations. Areas of

cooperation included logistics, combating terrorism, search and rescue at sea, countering piracy, theatre missile defence/missile defence and military academic exchanges – and related military activities.

Submarine crew search and rescue: Work in the area of submarine crew search and rescue at sea grew steadily following the signing of a framework agreement on cooperation in this area in February 2003. Russia participated in three NATO-led search-and-rescue exercises between 2005 and 2011

Defence transparency, strategy and reform: Aimed at building mutual confidence and transparency, dialogue took place on doctrinal issues, strategy and policy, including their relation to defence reform, nuclear weapons issues, force development and posture. Initiatives launched in the area of defence reform focused on the evolution of the military, management of human and financial resources, reform of defence industries, managing the consequences of defence reform, and defence-related aspects of combating terrorism. From 2002 to 2008, a NATO-Russia Resettlement Centre helped facilitate the integration of former Russian military personnel into civilian life by providing information regarding job search and resettlement, training and job placement services. Initially set up in Moscow, its operations were gradually expanded into the regions. Some 2,820 former military personnel from the Russian armed forces were re-trained and over 80 per cent found civilian employment.

Defence industrial cooperation: A broad-based "Study on NATO-Russia Defence Industrial and Research and Technological Cooperation", launched in January 2005 and completed in 2007, concluded that there was potential in combining scientific and technological capabilities to address global threats.

Logistics: Opportunities for logistics cooperation were pursued on both the civilian and military side, including areas such as air transport, air-to-air refuelling, medical services and water purification. Meetings and seminars focused on establishing a sound foundation of mutual understanding in the field of logistics by promoting information-sharing in areas such as logistics policies, doctrine, structures and lessons learned.

Civil emergencies: NATO and Russia cooperated between 1996 and 2014 to develop a capacity for joint action in response to civil emergencies, such as earthquakes and floods, and to manage the consequences of terrorist attacks. Moreover, a Russian proposal led to the establishment in 1998 of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.

Scientific cooperation: Russia was actively engaged with the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme from 1992. Scientists and experts from Russia sought to address a wide range of security issues, notably in the fields of defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents, mine detection and counter-terrorism (including explosives detection such as the STANDEX project mentioned above), and environmental and security hazards posed by oil spills and munitions dump sites in the Baltic Sea.

Terminology and language training: To facilitate better understanding of terms and concepts used by NATO and Russia, glossaries were developed on the entire spectrum of NATO-Russia cooperation. Language cooperation was expanded in 2011 with the launch of a project to harmonise language training for military and selected civilian experts at the Russian defence ministry.

Raising public awareness of the NRC: An NRC website was launched in June 2007 to increase public awareness of NRC activities. It was suspended in April 2014.

Bibliography and Useful Links

- https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49633.htm
- <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html#>
- https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49137.htm
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